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NOTES
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.: Stretching the Limits
of Statutory Interpretation?
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980's, X-Citement Video, Inc., and its owner, Rubin Gottesman,
became targets of a pornography investigation by the Los Angeles police and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). During the course of the investigation,
an undercover police officer, posing as a pornographic retailer, informed
Gottesman that he was interested in acquiring pornographic films starring the
minor, Traci Lords.' Gottesman sold the officer forty-nine tapes featuring
Lords, all of which were produced before her eighteenth birthday. In addition,
eight tapes were shipped to a FBI mail drop in Hawaii.
The Government charged Gottesman with violating Section 2252 of the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (the Act)2 which
prohibits any person from knowingly engaging in the interstate transportation,
shipping, receipt, distribution, or reproduction of visual depictions of minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.3 The defense claimed that Section 2252
was unconstitutional because to prove guilt the Government had to only show
that the defendant knowingly transported, shipped, received, distributed or
reproduced visual depictions and not that the defendant knew the films starred
Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. At this time, the media had recently released stories that Traci Lords was a minor when she
was filmed in many pornographic films. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464,
465 (1994).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994).
3. Section 2252 provides in relevant part:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means
including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct, and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains
materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means
including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any visual depiction for distribution
in interstate or foreign commerce through the mails if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct, and
(B) such visual depiction of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
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underage performers." The United States District Court for the Central District
of California rejected the defendant's argument and convicted him of violating
the Act.' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that under the First Amendment, a
defendant must possess knowledge of the minority age of at least one performer
in a pornographic film.6 Thus, because the same circuit in United States v.
Thomas had previously held that "knowingly," as used in the statute, did not
extend to the sexually explicit nature of materials or the minority of the
performers, Section 2252 was found unconstitutional on its face." Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the constitutionality of
Section 2252 based on traditional rules of statutory construction. Held:
"Knowingly" as used in the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation
Act extends to the sexually explicit nature of the materials as well as to the
minority of performers.'
. This note focuses on the Supreme Court decision in United States v. X-
Citement Video.9 Parts II and III examine the legislative history of the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act and the case law prior
to X-Citement Video. The reasoning of the majority and the dissent in this
decision is discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V analyzes why X-Citement Video
was correctly decided based on rules of statutory interpretation and prior case
law and points out the potential problems associated with this Supreme Court
decision.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1977, Congress responded to the growing problem of child pornography
with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act.'0 The Act
took many different forms before Congress passed the final version." The first
proposal only included Section 2251, designed to prevent the production of child
pornography. 2 However, a second provision, Section 2252, was proposed to
4. The defense also argued that Section 2252 was unconstitutional on its face because it was
vague and overbroad and that the Act violated the First and Fifth Amendments because the tapes in
question were not child pornography. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285,
1286-87 (9th Cir. 1992).
5. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
Gottesman was charged with violating Section 2252 of the Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994), and was sentenced to twelve months in jail and
fined $100,000.
6. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. The Court remanded to the District Court in light of United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d
1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826, 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990). Thomas held that Section 2252
did not contain a scienter requirement, but did not address the constitutional issue.
8. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
9. Id.
10. S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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reach distributors and recipients of child pornography. 3 Both Sections 2251
and 2252 originally included a mental element of "knowingly."'14
Commenting on the Act, the Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. Wald,
recommended the Senate Judiciary Committee delete the word "knowingly" in
Section 2251.13 She stated the inclusion of "knowingly" in this section would
require the Government to prove the defendant knew the exact age of the
child. 16 In contrast, Assistant Attorney General Wald stated that the use of
"knowingly" in the next section of the Act, Section 2252, "is appropriate to make
it clear that the bill does not apply to common carriers or other innocent
transporters who have no knowledge of the nature or character of the material
they are transporting.""
Congress eventually deleted "knowingly" from Section 2251.1 However,
the bill adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, following the Justice
Department's comments, excluded Section 2252 from the Act altogether. 9
Thus, whether the House of Representatives and the Senate adopted the views
of the Justice Department in later versions of Section 2252 remains unclear.
In response to the Senate's elimination of Section 2252, Senator Roth
proposed a new version of the statute." This version of Section 2252 provided
in part:
(a) No person may-
(1) knowingly transport, ship, mail in interstate or foreign
commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale any
film, photograph, negative, slide, book, magazine, or other
print or visual medium depicting a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct; or
(2) knowingly receive for the purpose of sale or distribution for
sale, or knowingly sell or distribute for sale, any film, photo-
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-30 (1977).
16. Id. at 28-29. Assistant Attorney General Wald stated, "We assume that it is not the
intention of the drafters to require the Government to prove that the defendant knew the child was
under age sixteen but merely to prove that the child was, in fact, less than age sixteen." Id at 29.
17. Id. at 29.
18. S. Conf. Rep. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 811, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977). 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (1978) (amended 1984) provides that:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to
engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual or print medium depicting such conduct,
shall be punished ... if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual or
print medium will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, or if such
visual or print medium has actually been transported in interstate or foreign commerce or
mailed.
19. S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1977).
20. 123 Cong. Rec. 33,047 (1977).
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graph, negative, slide, book, magazine, or other print or visual
medium depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct
which has been transported, shipped, or mailed in interstate or
foreign commerce."
Two senators clearly explained their intentions regarding "knowingly" in this
version of Section 2252. Senator Percy proffered that to act "knowingly,". "the
distributor or seller must have either, first, actual knowledge that the materials
do contain child pornographic depictions or, second, circumstances must be such
that he should have had such actual knowledge, and that mere inadvertence or
negligence would not alone be enough to render his actions unlawful."
Senator Roth, in reply, stated this version "insures that only those sellers or
distributors who are consciously and deliberately engaged in the marketing of
child pornography and thereby are actively contributing to the maintenance of
this form of child abuse are subject to prosecution under this amendment."
The Conference Committee adopted Senator Roth's version with some,
changes. This version of Section 2252 (a) provided:
(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce or
mails, for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale, any obscene visual
. or print medium, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the
use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct; or
(2) knowingly receives for the purpose of sale or distribution for sale,
or knowingly sells or distributes for sale, any obscene visual or print
medium that has been transported or shipped in interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed, if-
(A) the producing of such visual or print medium involves the
use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual or print medium depicts such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.'
Because prior jurisprudence dealing with pornography had always required the
materials to be "obscene," an obscenity requirement was included to allay fears
that the Roth proposal would not withstand a constitutional challenge.' The
21. Id.
22. 123 Cong. Rec. 33,050 (1977).
23. Id.
24. S. Conf. Rep. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) (emphasis added).
25. 124 Cong. Rec. 526 (1978). The Court eliminated obscenity from constitutionally protected
expression in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942). See Roth v.
United States, which stated, "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press." 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1309 (1957). See also Miller v. California, where a
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committee included the requirements that "the producing of such visual or print
medium involve[ ] the use of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct" and
that "such material or print medium depict[ ] such conduct," but placed these
two requirements in new subclauses (A) and (B). This revision resulted in the
word "minor" being further removed from the word "knowingly." 27 Unfortu-
nately, the Senate and House Conference Reports offer no additional assistance
in detecting the intended reach of "knowingly" in Section 2252.' Since
"knowingly" was not part of the subclause referring to the minority age of the
child, it remained unclear whether "knowingly" actually referred to this language
in the statute.
Congress amended the Act in 1984.29 These amendments were sparked by
the Supreme Court decision, New York v. Ferber, which held that a law
prohibiting non-obscene child pornography30 did not violate the First Amend-
ment.3 Reacting to this decision, Congress subsequently eliminated the
obscenity requirement found in Section 2252. In addition, Congress deleted the
requirement that the distribution of videotapes be for commercial purposes32 and
raised the age of majority from sixteen to eighteen years of age.33 Again,
Congress gave no indication of their intent regarding the use of "knowingly" in
the statute. 34  Thus, the final version of Section 2252 considered by the X-
Citement Video Court provides in relevant part:
majority of the Court agreed that a "state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).26. S. Conf. Rep. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977). See supra text accompanying note
24 for language of statute.
27. Petitioner's Brief at 25, United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
See supra text accompanying note 24 for language of statute.
28. The Conference Report states only that:
It is the intent of the conference committee that if a minor has engaged in this sexually
explicit conduct and there was a production of material using any printed or visual
medium depicting such conduct that persons who knowingly transport, ship, or mail for
the purpose of sale or distribution, or knowingly thereafter receive for sale or distribution,
or knowingly thereafter sell or distribute for sale any such material are liable whether or
not they have contact with the minor or the original production of the material.
S. Conf. Rep. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7(1977).
29. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292; 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994)).
30. Id. Although the phrase "non-obscene child pornography" may seem to be a contradiction
in terms, the rationale behind this decision is to offer greater protection to children by not demanding
the Government prove the child pornography meets the legal definition of "obscene." See infra note
86.
31. 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
32. Child Protection Act of 1984, § 4 (1).
33. Id. at § 5(a)(1).
34. Id.
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(a) Any person who-
(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means including by computer or mails, any
visual depiction, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that
has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, or which contains materials
which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any
means including by computer, or knowingly reproduces any
visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign com-
merce or through the mails if-
(A) the producing of such visual depictions involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section."
III. PRIOR CASE LAW
To better understand the Court's reasoning in X-Citement Video, the prior
case law dealing with traditional principles of statutory construction must be
examined. Additionally, it is important to see how these principles have been
extended to cases concerning 1) scienter requirements in general; 2) scienter
requirements in obscenity cases; and 3) scienter requirements in child pornogra-
phy cases.
A. Traditional Principles of Statutory Construction
Prior case law illustrates the Court's consistent rejection of constitutional
challenges to federal legislation. For example, in Yates v. United States,'6 the
defendants claimed that the Smith Act,37 which forbids teaching or advocating
the overthrow of the Government, prohibited constitutionally protected speech,
such as expressing opinions. The Court, however, rejected the defendants'
argument, relying on the well established principle of statutory construction that
35. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994) (emphasis added).
36. 354 U.S. 298, 77 S. Ct. 1064 (1957).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994).
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legislation is presumed to be constitutional.3' This reasoning was reiterated in
Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council:
39
The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. This
approach not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional
issues not be needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress,
like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress
intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it.40
In interpreting statutes, the Court has also considered whether a particular
reading of a statute will produce absurd results. In United States v. Turkette,41
the Court considered whether the term "enterprise" as used in the statute,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), encompassed both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.42 The defendant argued RICO was only
intended to protect legitimate enterprises from infiltration by racketeers and that
RICO "does not make criminal the participation in an association which performs
only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated [or] attempted to infiltrate a
legitimate enterprise." 43 The Court noted that if the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, the inquiry into construction is usually over." The
Court, however, further stated it will avoid absurd results and internal inconsis-
tencies.4' Therefore, RICO was held to apply to both legitimate and illegitimate
enterprises. 46
Finally, in Public Citizen v. Department of Jastice,47 the Court stated that
looking beyond the text is proper when the statute's result is inconsistent with
Congressional intent.48 The Department of Justice routinely aided the President
in appointing federal judges and regularly enlisted the help of the American Bar
Association (ABA) for potential nominees. 9 The World Legal Foundation
(WLF) asserted that the ABA was an "advisory committee" under the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and, thus, must release all of its records,
38. Id. at 318, 77 S. Ct. at 1076.
39. 485 U.S. 568, 108 S. Ct. 1392 (1988).
40. Id. at 575, 108 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
41. 452 U.S. 576, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 580, 101 S. Ct. at 2527.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 593, 101 S. Ct. at 2533-34.
47. 491 U.S. 440, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 441, 109 S. Ct. at 2559.
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including any names of potential nominees for federal judges, to the public."
The Court, however, dismissed the complaint, holding that the application of
FACA to the ABA committee would unconstitutionally interfere with the
President's Article II power to nominate federal judges and the doctrine of
separation of powers.5" Examining the congressional history of FACA, the
Court found that the Act was not intended to apply to the Justice Department's
communications with the ABA.
52
B. Principles of Statutory Construction Applied to Scienter Requirements
1. Scienter Requirements Generally
Traditional principles of statutory construction are pervasive in cases
concerned with scienter requirements. As the Supreme Court has stated, the
theory that the commission of a crime requires intent is as "universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and
a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good
and evil."53 Therefore, in the past, the courts have not interpreted Congressio-
nal silence as dispensing with a scienter requirement.~' Rather, the courts have
recognized "that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required
no statutory affirmation.
5 5
The United States Supreme Court applied these principles of statutory
construction in the landmark case, Morissette v. United States.' Morissette was
convicted of converting property belonging to the United States. The defendant
argued he lacked criminal intent because he reasonably believed the property was
abandoned. The Government asserted that the position of "knowingly" in the
federal conversion statute only extended to the verb "converts."57 Thus, the
prosecution would not need to prove that the defendant knew the property
belonged to the United States.
The Morissette Court, however, rejected the prosecution's argument.
Although the Court recognized that some crimes, typically known as public
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 457, 109 S. Ct. 2568.
53. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S. Ct. 240, 243 (1952).
54. Id. at 252, 72 S. Ct. at 244.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 246, 72 S. Ct. at 240.
57. 18 U.S.C.A. § 641 (1994) provides in part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of
another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money,
or thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or any
property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof ... Shall be fmed ....
(emphasis added).
(Vol. 56
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welfare offenses,5" do not require a mental element, the majority felt that the
federal conversion statute did not appropriately fit into this classification. 9 The
Court reasoned that, typically, public welfare offenses do not involve direct or
immediate injury to persons or property. Instead, the violations only create the
possibility of direct or immediate injury and the penalties attached are light in
nature.' In contrast, the crime of conversion, which was at issue in Morissette,
directly injures the community by creating feelings of insecurity.6' In addition,
the penalties under the statute at issue were harsh and could rise to felony status.
Therefore, the Court concluded that Congress omitted intent in the federal
conversion statute "in light of an unbroken course of judicial decision in all
constituent states of the Union holding intent inherent in this class of offense,
even when not express in the statute."62
The Sherman Antitrust Act63 and the Food Stamp Act" have also with-
stood constitutional challenges. 65 In United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
the Court held that the absence of an intent requirement in the antitrust statute
would not be construed as eliminating that element of the crime." "[I]nstead,
Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our
traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor ... ."" In
Liporota v. United States, the Court held that a federal statute dealing with food
stamp fraud contained a mens rea requirement." Therefore, the Government
must prove the defendant knew he acquired food stamps in an unauthorized
manner. The Court reasoned that to interpret the statute otherwise would
criminalize innocent conduct and that crimes without a mens rea requirement are
generally disfavored. The Court also noted ambiguity in a statute should be
construed in favor of lenity."
As recently as 1994, the Court affirmed the reasoning of Morissette in
Staples v. United States.7" The defendant, convicted of possessing a semi-
58. A public welfare offense is also known as a strict liability crime, which is defined as
"unlawful acts whose elements do not contain the need for criminal intent or mens rea." Black's Law
Dictionary 1422 (6th ed. 1990). For further discussion of public welfare offenses see infra text
accompanying notes 158-167.
59. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-54, 72 S. Ct. at 244-45.
60. Id. at 256, 72 S. Ct. at 246.
61. Id. at 260, 72 S. Ct. at 248.
62. Id. at 262, 72 S. Ct. at 249.
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
64. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides that "whoever knowingly uses,
transfers, acquires, alters, or possess coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized
by the [the statute] or the regulations" shall be guilty of a criminal offense (emphasis added).
65. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978); Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S. Ct. 2084 (1985).
66. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 437, 98 S. Ct. at 2873.
67. Id.
68. Liporota, 471 U.S. at 419, 105 S. Ct. at 2084.
69. Id. at 419, 105 S. Ct. at 2089.
70. 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
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automatic weapon in violation of the National Firearms Act,' argued he lacked
knowledge of the characteristics of his gun that made it violative of the statute.
The Court began its analysis with the language of the statute, noting that the
absence of a scienter requirement in the statute did not by itself show Congress
intended to delete a mental element as part of the crime.' Rather, Congress
must expressly or implicitly indicate the intent to dispense with the conventional
mental element requirement.73  In an analysis reminiscent of Morissette, the
Court also refused to characterize the National Firearms Act as a public welfare
offense. This interpretation would be incorrect because "it would mean easing
the path to convicting persons whose conduct would not even alert them to the
probability of strict regulation in the form of a statute such as Section
5861(d)."'74 In addition, the Court recognized that, unlike public welfare
offenses, this crime had a harsh penalty with the possibility of imprisonment for
ten years.75
2. Scienter Requirements in Obscenity Cases
The Court has also applied the principles of statutory interpretation regarding
scienter requirements to federal statutes prohibiting obscenity. '6 Because
obscenity and child pornography cases deal with similar types of materials, it is
helpful to track the Court's analyses in the obscenity area.
The Court first held that obscenity laws require a mental element in Smith v.
People of the State of California." In Smith, the defendant was arrested for
selling obscene books. The defendant, however, had no knowledge the books were
obscene. Recognizing the importance of protecting free speech under the First
Amendment, the Court stated that a public welfare offense interpretation would be
inappropriate. The Government feared that the defendant could always escape
conviction by feigning ignorance of the obscenity.79 In finding the statute had a
scienter requirement, however, the Court decided the Government could rectify this
situation by showing circumstances proving the defendant was "aware" of what the
book contained. 0 Later, in Hamling v. United States, the Court similarly upheld
71. 26 U.S.C.A, §§ 5801-5872 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
72. Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1796.
73. Id. at 1797.
74. Id. at 1802.
75. Id.
76. "Obscene" materials were definitively defined in Miller v. California as works which the
average person applying contemporary standards would find, when taken as a whole, appeal to the
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken
as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S.
Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
77. 361 U.S. 147, 80 S. Ct. 215 (1959).
78. Id. at 150, 80 S. Ct. at 217.
79. Id. at 152-53, 80 S. Ct. at 218-19.
80. Id.
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a federal obscenity statute requiring the Government to prove the defendant knew
the contents of the materials distributed and the nature and character of those
materials."' However, the Government did not have to prove the defendant knew
the materials were legally classified as obscene.'
3. Scienter Requirements in Child Pornography Cases
The first major Supreme Court case concerning child pornography laws was
New York v. Ferber.3 The defendant, a bookstore owner, was convicted of
knowingly promoting a filmed sexual performance by a child under sixteen years
of age in violation of a New York statute. The Court held that criminal
responsibility could not be imposed under child pornography laws without a
scienter requirement. The New York statute met this requirement because it
expressly included the mental element of "knowingly."84 In addition, the Court
held that non-obscene child pornography was not entitled to First Amendment
protection."5 This denial of First Amendment protection to child pornography
was justified because states have more leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children. 6
Finally, in Osborne v. Ohio, the Court addressed legislation prohibiting
private possession of child pornography. 7 The Court recognized that since the
Ferber decision, most distributors and producers of child pornography had gone
underground. Thus, to effectively eradicate child pornography, many states
wanted to prohibit private possession of these materials.s Again facing the
issue of scienter, the Court noted the Ohio statute in question did not expressly
include a mental element as part of the crime. The Court, however, relied on
another Ohio statute which applied a default mens rea requirement of "reckless-
ness" to statutes not specifying a scienter requirement. Thus, relying on the
default provision, the Court held the statute did contain a mental element as
required by Ferber.9
81. 418 U.S. 87, 94 S. Ct. 2887 (1974).
82. Id. at 121, 94 S. Ct. at 2911.
83. 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
84. Id. at 764-65, 102 S. Ct. at 3358-59.
85. Id. at 763, 102 S. Ct. at 3357.
86. Id. at 756-64, 102 S. Ct. at 3354-57. The Court offered the following reasons to support
this premise. First, advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic motive for the
production of such materials. Second, child pornography has an extremely negative impact on the
welfare of children. Third, the Court has traditionally sustained legislation aimed at protecting
children, even when those laws operated in sensitive areas of constitutionally protected rights.
Finally, the Court found a casual relationship between the distribution of child pornography and the
sexual abuse of children. Because the materials are a permanent record of the child's pornography,
the harm to the child is prolonged by the circulation of those materials. The distribution of child
pornography must be stopped if the production of child pornography is to be effectively controlled.
87. 495 U.S. 103, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
88. Id. at 110, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
89. Id. at 115, l10 S. Ct. at 1699.
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IV. THE X-CITEMENT VIDEO OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, first addressed the
holding of the appellate court which found Section 2252 unconstitutional on its
face for lack of a scienter requirement." The majority found the reading of
Section 2252 by the appellate court improper for two reasons. First, the reading
of the statute by the Ninth Circuit would lead to absurd results.91 Second, the
Court found the holding of the appellate court inconsistent with the principle of
statutory construction which establishes a presumption of scienter even when not
expressed in the statute. 2
The Ninth Circuit held that knowingly in Section 2252 only modified the verbs
transporting, shipping, distributing, receiving and reproducing and did not modify
the language in the statute referring to the sexually explicit nature of the materials
or the minority age of the performers.93 Chief Justice Rehnquist found this
interpretation to yield an "odd result."' According to the majority, if this were
the intent of Congress, the law would distinguish between someone who knowingly
ships materials and someone who unknowingly ships materials. 5 Under this
interpretation of the law, knowledge of the contents of the materials would be
irrelevant.96 Continuing this analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist felt this reading
could lead to an absurd result-the conviction of persons who did not know they
were dealing with sexually explicit materials. To illustrate this point, the Court
offered the example of a druggist who routinely develops film, later finding out that
some of the film was sexually explicit. 7 Citing United States v. Turkette" and
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice," the Court concluded that it would not
presume Congress intended the absurd results that would follow from this example
and other similar examples.'
The Court then reviewed its prior decisions addressing statutes that arguably
lacked a necessary mental element. Applying the principles of statutory
construction utilized in Morissette, Liparota, and Staples..' to Section 2252, the
90. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 466 (1994).
91. Id. at 467.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 466.
94. Id. at 466.
95. Id. at 467.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2527 (1981). See supra text
accompanying notes 41-46.
99. Public Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 435-55, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566-67 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
100. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467.
101. In Morissette, the Supreme Court declined to find the federal conversion statute unconstitu-
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majority first rejected a public welfare offense classification for the statute
because most people do not believe that film and magazines are subject to strict
regulations by the Government. 2 In addition, this statute provided the harsh
penalty of the possibility of ten years in prison. 3 Concluding that Section
2252 should contain a scienter requirement, the Court noted that a mental
element should generally apply to all elements of a crime. Because non-obscene
materials depicting persons over the age of seventeen are constitutionally
protected, "the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal
innocence from wrongful conduct."'' " To further support this conclusion, the
Court noted that criminal responsibility could not be imposed without scienter
because to do so would raise serious constitutional questions."0 Thus, under
principles of statutory construction, the Court can properly eliminate these doubts
if the elimination is not contrary to Congressional intent.'0 6
In the next step of the analysis, to determine Congressional intent, the Court
examined the legislative history of Section 2252. Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that the numerous revisions to Section 2252 made it hard to
discern Congressional intent concerning its use of "knowingly."'0" He rea-
soned, however, that Congress was aware of the 1959 decision Smith v.
California' in which the Supreme Court struck down an obscenity statute for
lack of a mental element.1 9 Thus, Congress must have been aware that the
Constitution demands a scienter requirement when it passed Section 2252.1 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist further stated that if Congress was not aware of the
Smith decision, the Court would not conclude that Congress intended to draft
unconstitutional legislation."'
tional because the absence of a scienter requirement in the statute was not enough to conclude that
Congress intended to eliminate a mental element. 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952). For a detailed
discussion of this case see supra text accompanying notes 56-62. Likewise, in Liparota, the Court
rejected a constitutional challenge to the Food Stamp Act holding that "knowingly," as used in the
statute, extends to "in any manner not authorized by statute." 471 U.S. 419, 105 S. Ct. 2084 (1985).
7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides that "whoever knowingly uses, transfers,
acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by [the
statute] or the regulations" shall be guilty of a criminal offense (emphasis added). For a discussion
of this case see supra text accompanying notes 68-69. Again, in Staples, the Court, relying on the
principles set forth in Morissette, read a mental element into the National Firearms Act. 114 S. Ct.
1793 (1994). For a discussion of this case see supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
102. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 467-69.
103. Id. at 469.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 467.
106. Id. at 472.
107. Id. at 469.
108. 361 U.S. 147, 80 S. Ct. 215 (1959).
109. Id.
110. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 469.
111. Id.
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Analyzing separately the sexually explicit nature of materials and minority
requirements in the statute, the Court first considered the effect of "knowingly"
on the language in Section 2252 referring to the sexually explicit nature of
materials." 2 Before the 1984 amendment to Section 2252, the statute included
an obscenity requirement."' Therefore, the Court summized that if Congress
was aware of Smith, "knowingly" was at least intended to modify "obscene.""1 4
After the deletion of the obscenity requirement in 1984,' the other elements
defining the character and content of the materials remained in subsections (1)(A)
and (2)(A)."' Yet, Congress did not express an intent to eliminate the scienter
requirement that had extended to the character and content of the materials via
the word "obscene.""17
The Court's next inquiry was the effect of the word "knowingly" on the
phrase "use of a minor" in the statute."' The defendant argued that the Justice
Department's comments on a proposed version of the Act, particularly that the
age of the child was not an element of the crime, proved Congressional intent to
eliminate a scienter requirement in the statute." 9 The Court, however, refused
to consider as persuasive any Congressional history of the first version of Section
2252 which was not adopted by Congress. 2 Yet, the Court did pay particular
attention to the statements made by Senators Roth and Percy concerning Roth's
version of Section 2252.21 In addition, the majority found it significant that
the changes in Senator Roth's version of Section 2252 led to the minority
requirement being placed in a newly created subclause."
In conclusion, the legislative history of Section 2252 persuaded the Court
that Congress intended "knowingly" to extend to the sexually explicit nature of
material. 2 ' Thus, the Court extended the use of "knowingly" found in
subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2) to subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2)(A).'21 Because
the sexually explicit requirement is found in the same clause as the minority age
requirement, the Court found it grammatically inconsistent to apply the mental
element to one requirement in the clause and not the other." Therefore, to
112. See supra text accompanying note 35 for language of Section 2252.
113. S. Conf. Rep. No. 601, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
114. X-Cltement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 470.
115. Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292; 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994)).
116. Id. Subsection (1)(A) and (2)(A) provide that the "producing of such visual depiction
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct...
117. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 470.
118. See supra text accompanying note 35 for language of Section 2252.
119. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 470.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 470-71.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 35 for language of Section 2252.
125. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 471-72.
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correct this internal inconsistency, "knowingly" was extended to apply to the
minority age requirement.'26
B. The Dissent
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent," recognized that the Court reasonably
and permissibly imparted a mental element into the statutes at issue in Morissette
and Liparota.25 The dissent, however, argued that applying the principles used
in those cases to the statute at issue in X-Citement Video would contradict the
plain language of the statute.' The dissent opined that the Court should only
read a mental element into a statute if Congress had not addressed the question
of a mental element or if Congress was ambiguous regarding the intent required
in the statute.1
30
The dissent also noted that the Court had previously denied certiori in United
States v. Thomas,'3' in which the lower court held Section 2252 did not include
a scienter requirement.132 Justice Scalia felt the interpretation by the Thomas
court was the correct grammatical reading of the statute. 3 3 If Congress did
intend "knowingly" to apply only to the enumerated verbs in Section 2252 and
not to the sexually explicit nature of the materials or the minority of the
performers, "it would be impossible to construct a sentence structure that more
clearly conveys that thought, and that thought alone."'" Justice Scalia
supported this conclusion by noting that the word "knowingly" was not in a
distant phrase, as in other cases considered by this Court, but was placed in a
separate clause from the sexually explicit nature of materials and minority of
performers requirements.' 3  Based on a plain reading of Section 2252, the
dissent concluded that the statute is unambiguous and unconstitutional.' 3
The legislative history of the statute reinforced the dissent's conclusion that
Section 2252 lacked a scienter requirement. While the majority refused to give
weight to the Justice Department's comments on the first version of Section
2252, Justice Scalia relied heavily on these statements in his analysis.
Particularly, the dissenting opinion recited the Justice Department's comments
that the "bill is not intended to apply to innocent transportation with no
knowledge of the nature or character of the material involved" and that "[t]he
126. Id.
127. Justice Scalia was joined in dissent by Justice Thomas. Id. at 473.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826, 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990).
132. Id. at 1070.
133. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 473.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
19961
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
defendant's knowledge of the age of the child is not an element of the
offense."'" The combination of these two statements, as applied to the final
version of Section 2252, led to the dissent's opinion that Congress intended the
scienter requirement to extend to the sexually explicit nature of materials but not
to the minority of the performers requirement.'The dissent rejected the majority's analysis of the statute for two reasons.
The majority stated it was grammatically inconsistent to extend "knowingly" to
one element in a subclause and not to the other element.'39 Justice Scalia,
however, argued that based on traditional principles of statutory construction
"knowingly" should not be extended to either element." The majority further
argued that "[a] statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age
of the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts..'.. Justice Scalia
disagreed with this contention by the majority, reasoning it would not be
improper for Section 2252 to be written as a strict liability crime."42 Support-
ing this assertion, the dissent noted that the Court had consistently stated that
these materials are afforded less protection than other speech."4 Thus, in
Young v. American Mini Theaters,'" the Court stated:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different and lesser magnitude than the
interest in untrammeled political debate... .s
In addition, the Ferber Court had recognized the important governmental
objective of preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children.'"
Finally, Justice Scalia expressed his concern that the invalidation of the
statute "[would] cause Congress to leave the world's children inadequately
protected against the depredations of the pornography trade.""4  Nevertheless,
he found that correctly construed, Section 2252, was unconstitutional, "since, by
imposing criminal liability upon those not knowingly dealing in pornography, it
establishes a severe deterrent, not narrowly tailored to its purposes, upon fully
137. Id. at 474.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2448
(1976); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3037 (1978); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 24. 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2614-15 (1973)).
144. 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976).
145. Id. at 69, 96 S. Ct. at 2452.
146. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 475 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S. Ct.
3348 (1982)).
147. Id.
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protected First Amendment activities.""'  According to Justice Scalia, this
finding of unconstitutionality prevented the Court from reinterpreting the statute
to say something the plain language of the statute does not impart to the
reader.'49 Justice Scalia stated:
Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as
to save it against constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this
to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute ... or judicially
rewriting it. Otherwise, there would be no such thing as an unconstitu-
tional statute.150
V. ANALYSIS
The majority opinion in X-Citement Video was consistent with traditional
rules of interpretation and prior case law. From Morissette"' in 1952 to
Staples' 2 in 1994, the Court has shown its reluctance to invalidate federal
legislation. Therefore, based on precedent, this decision was correctly decided.
The practitioner, however, should consider the following questions which arise
because of the Court's analysis and decision in X-Citement Video.
A. Does X-Citement Video Represent an Extension of Prior Case Law?
The X-Citement Video opinion raises interesting philosophical questions
regarding the Court's ability to correct legislative ambiguity or error. Specifical-
ly, after this decision, it is unclear what type of statute will be held unconstitu-
tional for lack of a scienter requirement. In Morissette and Liparota, "knowing-
ly" was extended to phrases within the same paragraph.' Thus, X-Citement
Video is an extension of the analyses in these cases because in X-Citement Video,
the Court extended "knowingly" to elements in separate subclauses of the
statute." 4
As Justice Scalia noted, if Congress intended no scienter requirement in
those subclauses, it could hardly have written the statue differently to better
express that intent.' The legislative history of Section 2252 offers some
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 476 (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Shor, 478 U.S. 833, 841, 106
S. Ct. 3245, 3251 (1986)) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515, 84 S. Ct. 1659,
1668 (1964)).
151. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952).
152. Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994).
153. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 246, 72 S. Ct. at 240; Liparola, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S. Ct. 2084
(1985).
154. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 464.
155. Id. at 473.
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proof, although not definitively, that Congress did intend for the statute to have
a mental element. 5 6 In future cases, however, the legislative history of some
statutes may not provide evidence as to Congressional intent regarding scienter
requirements. How far will the Court go to read in a scienter requirement
without evidence as to Congressional intent? What must Congress do to exclude
a scienter requirement from federal legislation? Will Congress have to expressly
state that it intends a statute to have no mental element? Considering these
questions, one can certainly appreciate Justice Scalia's concern that the X-
Citement Video opinion may lead to the possibility that no statute will be
construed as unconstitutional. 7
B. Did the X-Citement Video Court Impart the Correct Level of Scienter into
Section 2252?
1. A Strict Liability Interpretation
Importantly, the Court imparted a scienter requirement of "knowledge" into
Section 2252, rejecting the possibility of a public welfare offense classification.
A public welfare offense or strict liability crime is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as "unlawful acts whose elements do not contain the need for criminal
intent or mens rea.""58
Justice Scalia's dissent raised the point that child pornography is not
protected by the First Amendment and that the governmental objective of
protecting children from sexual exploitation is extremely important."5 9
Arguably, a strict liability interpretation of Section 2252 would be justified by
the extreme harm to children caused by child pornography."6 Three factors
are inherent in strict liability crimes. 6' First, the crime is part of a regulatory
scheme.'62 The Government does regulate child pornography as evidenced by
the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act."6 Another factor
is that requiring proof of mens rea would impede the implementation of
156. 123 Cong. Rec. 33,050 (1977).
157. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 475.
158. Black's Law Dictionary 1422 (6th ed. 1990).
159. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 475.
160. "Child pornography and child prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion
industries that operate on a nationwide scale." S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1977),
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, at 40, 42. Research done in the 1970's documented the
existence of over 260 different magazines depicting children in sexually explicit conduct. These
magazines depict children, sometimes as young as three to five years of age, in activities including
intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, rape, incest and sado-masochism. Sexual Exploitation
of Children: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 41-42 (1977).
161. Morissette v. Untied States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240 (1952).
162. Id. at 254, 72 S. Ct. at 245.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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legislative purpose.'" A requirement of "knowledge" in Section 2252 may
produce a heavy burden for the Government in cases against those allegedly
violating the Act. Many defendants will argue they did not know the film
contained a child actor or that the mature appearance of the child did not alert
them to the minority age of the child. Finally, strict liability crimes usually
involve light penalties. 65 Section 2252 provides a harsh penalty. Thus, this
factor is not met and cannot be met unless Congress changes the punishment.
Although technically two of three factors are met, policy considerations
make a public welfare classification inappropriate for Section 2252. A strict
liability standard may lead to the conviction of persons who are not the target of
Section 2252. Because non-obscene, sexually explicit materials involving
persons over the age of seventeen are protected by the First Amendment,'" one
can assume that Section 2252 was designed to target those individuals that deal
with child pornography, not adult pornography. The facts of X-Citement Video
provide a useful example of how some individuals who are not the target of
Section 2252 would be convicted under a strict liability interpretation. Traci
Lords and her husband misrepresented to producers of adult pornography that she
was over eighteen. This scheme was aided by a fake California driver's license,
a fake United States passport and a fake birth certificate. She was then
photographed in an adult magazine, Penthouse, and in many adult films. 67
Under a strict liability interpretation, individuals who purchased adult materials
featuring the minor, Traci Lords, would be criminally liable. Perhaps the only
way for a person to avoid conviction would be to stop purchasing adult
pornography, a constitutionally protected act. Considering that the purpose of
Section 2252 is to deter persons from dealing with child pornography and that
adult pornography is constitutionally protected, a strict liability interpretation of
Section 2252 would be inappropriate.
2. Recklessness
The Court also rejected a recklessness standard for Section 2252. The
Model Penal Code defines recklessness as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
164. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 257, 72 S. Ct. at 247.
165. Id. at 256, 72 S. Ct. at 246.
166. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771 (1993); Sable Communications of
California, Inc., 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836-37(1989); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 224, 110 S. Ct. 596, 604 (1990); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152, 80 S. Ct. 215,
218 (1959).
. 167. Respondent's Brief at 8, X-Citement Video (1994 WL 379096).
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to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation. 6 '
In Osborne v. Ohio,69 the Court found that a child pornography statute lacked
a mental element but saved the statute by reading in a standard of "reckless-
ness." o7 At least one commentator, arguing that the "knowledge" standard
imposes a heavy burden on the Government, urged the Court to follow
Osborne.' With a recklessness standard, the defendant could be convicted
once he disregarded a substantial risk that the film contained child actors. Judge
Kozinski, who dissented in the Ninth Circuit opinion of X-Citement Video, also
supported this analysis.' He stated that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
obscenity cases was improper and that the court should have relied solely on
child pornography cases.' Thus, the Osborne decision, in which the Court
read a recklessness requirement into a child pornography statute, was his
authority for reading a recklessness requirement into Section 2252."
This analysis, however, presents two problems. First, importing a
"recklessness" standard into Section 2252 would be textually inconsistent because
"knowingly" was expressly written into the statute. Additionally, in oral
argument, the Supreme Court seemed to accept the prosecution's rejection of the
"recklessness" standard. Arguing before the Supreme Court, Solicitor General
Days stated that a "recklessness" standard was inappropriate because "knowing-
ly" was already in the statute and should be consistently applied to all of the
elements of the offense unless Congress suggested something to the contrary.
Additionally, he argued the legislative history supported the prosecution's view
that "knowingly" was the intended requirement in the statute.'"
A second problem that recurs under the "recklessness" standard is the
potential convictions of persons who are not the target of Section 2252. For
example, consider an individual who goes to an adult video store and chooses to
buy what he believes to be an adult film. Assume, also, that the packaging of
the film in no way alerts the individual that the film contains a child actor. This
individual has no way of knowing of the "risk" of child actors in the film. By
the time the person watches the film and sees a child actor, he can no longer
avoid the "risk" because criminal liability has already attached.
168. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1962).
169. 495 U.S. 103, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
170. Id.
171. Robert F. Schwartz, Federal Child Pornography Law's Scienter Requirement-United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 585 (1993).
172. United States v. X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d 1285 (1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-4, X-Citement Video (1994 WL 665284).
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C. What Exactly Does the Government Need to Show to Prove "Knowledge"
in Section 2252?
Considering the difficulties with reading Section 2252 as a strict liability
crime or as including a "recklessness" standard, it appears that the "knowledge"
standard was correctly extended to all of the elements in the statute. Not only
is a "knowledge" standard textually consistent with the language of the statute,
but in addition, under this standard, those persons who have no intent to deal
with child pornography will not be swept into the ambit of the statute. This
decision, however, may still present an immediate problem for the Government
when prosecuting persons under Section 2252. Specifically, the Court failed to
establish what precisely the defendant must "know" to be criminally liable under
this statute.
Several hypotheticals help to illustrate this problem. Must the defendant
know the exact age of the child or simply that the child was under eighteen? In
light of the legislative history, the Court would not require "knowledge" of the
exact age of the child.'76 A defendant, however, who ordered a film marketed
as child pornography, that did not actually contain minor actors would not be
liable under this Act. Although conviction of this person would further the
purpose of Section 2252, to deter persons from dealing with child pornography,
this hypothetical would not meet the requirements of X-Citement Video.'"
Although the defendant would know of the sexually explicit nature of the
materials, the film would not actually contain child actors. Thus, the defendant
could not have knowledge of child actors in the film.
Extending this hypothetical, can a defendant successfully escape conviction
by stating that he could not tell the child was a minor because of his mature
appearance? Section 2252 is aimed at protecting all children under the age of
eighteen. Remember, however, the photos of Traci Lords in Penthouse. Could
a reasonable person discern that she was seventeen, which violates Section 2252,
as opposed to eighteen years of age which is not in violation of this statute?
Arguably, a mistake of age defense should be allowed under a "knowledge"
standard for Section 2252. If not, the statute would revert to a strict liability
standard, where a defendant with no knowledge of the minority status of a child
actor would be criminally liable. Yet, in light of the policies to protect all minor
children, the courts should apply an objective standard to this defense and require
the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable person
could not have discerned the actor was a minor.
176. S. Rep. No. 438, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-30 (1977).
177. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464, 471 (1994).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Child pornography is a serious problem in America today"" and arguably
the Government should use all avenues constitutionally available to stop this
crime. The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act represents
the legislature's attempt to thwart the growth of the child pornography
industry.1'7 This legislation, however, also represents the struggle encountered
by the legislature in drafting precise and constitutional legislation. In X-Citement
Video, the Supreme Court had to rule upon the constitutionality of Section 2252
considering complicated and arguably unclear legislative history, the policies
against invalidating legislation, and the strong policies associated with ending
child pornography.'"*
While prior case law had extended a scienter requirement to all elements
within the same phrase or paragraph of a statute, the Supreme Court in X-
Citement Video, for the first time, extended a mental element to separate
subclauses of a statute.'' This extension of prior case law by the Court was
logical considering the facts and legislative history surrounding this case.'u
The holding of X-Citement Video, however, should not be construed as granting
unlimited power to the courts to save all ambiguous legislation. Courts in the
future, keeping the doctrine of separation of powers in mind, should be wary of
stretching the limits of statutory interpretation any further. This may not prove
to be an easy task. In light of X-Citement Video, the courts will now have to
walk a fine line between constitutionally interpreting ambiguous legislative
history and judicially rewriting legislation.'83
Patricia A. Burke
178. See supra note 168.
179. S. Rep. 438, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977).
180. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. 464.
181. Id. at 471.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 90-126.
183. "Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against
constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a
statute...' or judicially rewriting it." Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Shor, 478 U.S. 833,
841, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3251 (1986) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515, 84
S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (1964)).
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